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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

28 June 1963

TO: Mr. Fred L. Hadsel  
Room 6247  
Bureau of African Affairs  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Comments on "Draft Strategic Study: Nigeria:"

Attached, for your consideration, are our comments on the Nigerian Strategic Study. They represent a coordinated view of the covert and DD/I components of CIA concerned. If there are any questions or we can be of further help, please contact me

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General Comments

1. We are in agreement with this paper's underlying assessment that a greater national unity is essential in the face of the potential threat of a breakup of the Nigerian federation; and we concur in the view that the best instrument for achieving national unity will probably be a government of national union. Nevertheless, we feel that the Study is somewhat optimistic about the prospects for achieving a greater national unity and the likelihood of increased stability resulting from the establishment of a government of national union. Further, we believe that a greater centralization of authority will more than likely tend to undermine Nigeria's nascent democratic institutions. We feel this is the lesser of two evils but we still remain concerned that fuller cognizance be given to the implications, for both Nigeria and the US, of fostering this development.

2. We would suggest including a more extensive analysis of the difficulty of forming a government of national union in which "all major political parties" would participate. How would a government of national union -- as is suggested on page 28 -- limit contention among the various political parties and/or factions?

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What political parties -- especially in the Western Region -- would qualify? There is little evidence that the UPP, which commands meaningful support only in Lagos and environs, has established itself as a significant party. Nevertheless, as a member of the governing coalition in the west, the UPP almost certainly would have to be included. Representation by the Action Group also presents a problem. The Yoruba people would resist being represented by the UPP and in fact probably would consider themselves inadequately represented unless Awolowo were to receive an important portfolio in the new government. In view of the federal coalition's past efforts to destroy both Awolowo and his party, it seems unlikely that the AG leader would be offered any position unless the coalition became convinced that national unity demanded such a concession. Any meaningful concession to Awolowo might prompt Amino Kano and leaders of lesser political elements to demand representation. NEPU, moreover, could claim to speak for more people in the north than does the UPP in the west.

3. Regarding Nigeria's economic prospects, we would again suggest that the difficulties are a bit more foreboding than indicated in this Study. For example, the shortage of skilled

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administrators, which is not dealt with at length, will almost certainly pose a major difficulty in the future. Although the top-level economic planners are capable, there is little backup of administrative talent to execute economic plans and programs. This is especially true in the Northern Region which already lags far behind in the development of a modern political and economic sector. We believe this weakness will pose a greater problem than is hinted at in the Study.

4. We wish particularly to stress the importance of the problem outlined in Section X on the needs of the security forces, and to note our belief in the desirability of the first suggested line of action.

#### Specific Suggestions

Page 30, line 1 -- Perhaps this sentence should be redrafted to avoid confusion regarding the present position of the Action Group.

Page 30, first paragraph -- This paragraph presents the assumption that the next generation of African politicians will be more inclined to radical solutions to their problems than the current leaders. This is a definite possibility

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but not a certainty, and we would suggest that the last two sentences of the paragraph be changed to read:

"This group may possibly be more narrowly...". "...they / will probably be more deeply... and possibly more inclined..."

Page 50, line 1 -- With respect to Western support of the ULC, while such support may have been ineffective, we do not feel that it has been "counterproductive." If Western support had not been forthcoming to the ULC, the IULC, which is certainly no better and is probably worse, might have gained the advantage.

Page 57, section on "The Role of the UK" -- This section should be updated to take account of the fact that the adverse Privy Council decision did not lead to the expected hostile reaction by the Nigerian Government.

Page 62, line 13 and page 150, line 8 -- We wonder if the sentiment for the formation of a government of national union is as strong as is suggested on pages 62 and 150. We suggest revising the sentence on page 62 to read as follows: "As a consequence ... unity, sentiment has increased in Nigeria ..."; line 8 on page 150 could be similarly revised to read: "This sentiment is taking the form of increasing support...". This would bring the tenor of these sections in line with the similar comments on pages 27 and 28.

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Page 66, section on "Labor" and page 66 ff in the conclusions --

We believe these parts of the paper should be updated to reflect the GON's offer to back the ULC as against the IULC.

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